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The Pardy-Ruhl Dialogue on Ecosystem
Management Part V: Discretion, Complex-
Adaptive Problem Solving and the
Rule of Law
BRUCE PARDY*
[Tihe very men who are most anxious to plan society [are] the
most dangerous if they were allowed to do so - and the most in-
tolerant of the planning of others. From the saintly and single-
minded idealist to the fanatic is often but a step. Though it is the
resentment of the frustrated specialist which gives the demand
for planning its strongest impetus, there could hardly be a more
unbearable - and more irrational - world than one in which the
most eminent specialists in each field were allowed to proceed
unchecked with the realization of their ideals.
F.A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom'
I. INTRODUCTION
We are actually getting somewhere. This dialogue on ecosys-
tem management (EM) in the Pace Environmental Law Review
(PELR) began in 2003, when I challenged the widely held view
that EM is the only environmental strategy now possible. 2 I ar-
gued that neither the ecological theory of nonequilibrium nor the
widespread effects of humans on ecosystems demands a manage-
ment approach to the environment. 3 In his Response to the arti-
cle, Professor J.B. Ruhl objected to my objections and reasserted
EM's status as the only feasible response to current environmen-
tal problems. 4 My Reply to Ruhl identified common ground and
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Queen's University, Kingston, Canada.
Comments are welcome at pardyb@queensu.ca.
1. F. A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 55 (1944).
2. Bruce Pardy, Changing Nature: The Myth of the Inevitability of Ecosystem
Management, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 675 (2003) [hereinafter Changing Nature].
3. Id.
4. J.B. Ruhl, The Myth of What is Inevitable Under Ecosystem Management: A
Response to Pardy, 21 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 315 (2004) [hereinafter Ruhl, Response].
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diagnosed old and new differences. 5 We have identified things to
agree about and to disagree about, and have whittled away to get
to the heart of the "intractable gap between us."6
In my Reply, I proposed that as a discretionary process, EM
facilitates utilitarian decision-making. Because utilitarian deci-
sions are likely to place short-term human interests ahead of eco-
logical priorities, they can have the effect of degrading ecosystems
rather than protecting them. In Part IV, Ruhl picks up the theme
of discretion. 7 He questions whether the discretion contained
within EM is really all that different from the discretion found
within traditional legal processes, and contends that discretion in
the hands of managers is no worse than discretion in the hands of
judges.8 "I cannot agree," he writes in Part IV, "that an EM ap-
proach has 'more' discretion or a higher potential for arbitrary ex-
ercise of discretion."9
II. DISCRETION IN ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT
A. The meaning of the rule of law
The question of discretion in EM cuts to the core of the way
one conceives environmental law. How much discretion is appro-
priate? What kind? In whose hands? We agree on the kinds of
environmental outcomes to be sought.10 We differ on how those
5. Bruce Pardy, Ecosystem Management in Question: A Reply to Ruhl, 23 PACE
ENvTL. L. REV. 209 (2005-2006) [hereinafter Pardy, Reply].
6. The Pardy-Ruhl Dialogue on Ecosystem Management, Part IV: Narrowing and
Sharpening the Questions, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV 25, 25 (2007) [hereinafter Ruhl,
Part V]. I share Professor Ruhl's enthusiasm for this exchange, which has been en-
gaging and rewarding, and I am delighted to have come to know him inside and
outside the pages of the PELR. The editors of the PELR have encouraged and facili-
tated this rare opportunity for direct scholarly dialogue, and I would like to thank
them for their interest and editorial assistance.
7. Ruhl, Part IV, supra note 6, at 26, 31. This dialogue originally focused on
whether EM is inevitable. In tackling the issue of discretion in EM, we are no longer
debating whether EM is inevitable but instead are addressing whether EM is supe-
rior to other possibilities. Whether EM is the best option available is indeed the logi-
cal next question to consider in the EM debate. However, the question is relevant
only if EM is not inevitable. (If EM is inevitable, then it does not matter whether it is
superior or inferior because no other choice would be possible.)
8. Id. at 32-33.
9. Ruhl, Part IV, supra note 6, at 33.
10. We have both referred with approval to Edward Grumbine's description of five
principal goals of EM: maintaining viable populations of all native species in situ;
representing, within protected areas, all native ecosystem types across their natural
range of variation; maintaining evolutionary and ecological processes; maintaining
the evolutionary potential of species and ecosystems; and accommodating human use
and occupancy within these constraints. (Ruhi, Response, supra note 4, at 316, citing
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outcomes can be achieved. Ruhl has argued that only a system of
EM, in which broad discretion is placed in the hands of managers
to craft desirable environmental outcomes, is capable of achieving
positive results. 1 I maintain that while EM may well be effective
in certain specific circumstances, it is not the approach that will
stem the tide of ecosystem degradation currently under way.
The legal enterprise is about controlling the actions of two
groups of people: those who are governed, and those who govern.
The state controls the first group with laws that impose upon be-
havior: prohibitions, positive obligations, civil and criminal liabil-
ity, and so on. The rule of law controls the second group by
placing limits on their powers: constitutional restrictions, separa-
tion of powers, precedent and stare decisis, the expectation for
written reasons from adjudicative bodies, judicial review, the re-
quirements of natural justice and procedural fairness, the availa-
bility of appeals, and so on. The classical liberal meaning of the
rule of law is a system based upon generally applicable, abstract
rules and limited state discretion, in which government entities
are subject to the same law as ordinary citizens. 12 Separation of
powers means that no single person or authority has the ability to
determine the resolution of a conflict. Thus, every prosecution in-
volves a statutory or regulatory prohibition (enacted by the legis-
lative branch), an investigation and prosecution (performed by the
executive branch) and a hearing (conducted by the judicial
branch). Every civil action involves either a statutory cause of ac-
tion (legislative) or common law cause of action (from the deci-
sions of many previous courts) and a hearing (by the court seized
with the case). In every judicial hearing the court is bound by
statute or precedent or both, as well as a multitude of procedural
and evidentiary rules that limit the court's ability to proceed
idiosyncratically.
R. Edward Grumbine, What Is Ecosystem Management?, 8 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 27,
31 (1994); Pardy, Reply, supra note 5, at 214-215.).
11. Ruhl, Part IV, supra note 6, at 33.
12. "Stripped of all technicalities, [the rule of law] means that government in all
its activities is bound by rules fixed and announced before-hand - rules which make it
possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in
given circumstances and to plan one's individual affairs on the basis of his knowl-
edge." HAYEK, supra note 1, at 80. According to Tamanaha, Hayek accepted that dis-
cretion can be exercised by government officials as long as the discretion is pursuant
to legal rules that are general, equal and certain, and as long as their decisions are
subject to judicial supervision. BRIAN T lAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAw: HISTORY,
POLITICS, THEORY 67 (2004).
20081 343
3
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
These norms limit discretion. They decrease flexibility in ex-
change for protection from arbitrary measures. They do not create
absolute predictability; traditional legal processes are far from
mechanistic. Decisions in difficult cases are hardly formulaic, and
there is often ambiguity in the law and in the facts. Nevertheless,
legal results would be more unpredictable and unprincipled with-
out these limitations upon the powers of decision-makers.
B. Why the rule of law matters in environmental law
Rule of law norms prevent concentration of power and thus
protect citizens from political tyranny. But that is not the only
reason they are important. They also facilitate achievement of the
law's objectives by limiting slippage between statutory objectives
and results in particular cases. 13
From the perspective of an administrative agency, this pro-
position may seem counter-intuitive. Rule of law norms limit dis-
cretion, and thus, can be perceived as obstacles to effectiveness.
They restrict the ability of agencies to "do whatever it takes" to get
the job done, whatever that job may be. From the perspective of
government officials, those restrictions make the achievement of
policy objectives seem more difficult because problems cannot be
tackled directly and independently. Instead the agency must
share the enterprise with other state organs-relying upon the
legislature to formulate effective general rules; and upon courts or
tribunals to interpret rules properly and produce sensible results
in particular cases. But in spite of this perception, these limita-
tions make the actions of state actors more effective, not less so.1 4
They improve decisions by insulating decision-makers from com-
13. K. WEBB, POLLUTION CONTROL IN CANADA: THE REGULATORY APPROACH IN THE
1980s 17-18 (1988) (characterizing the divergence between statutory objectives and
particular results as the "implementation gap").
14. See Howard Latin, Regulatory Failure, Administrative Incentives, and the
New Clean Air Act, 21 ENVTL. L. 1647 (1991) (describing eight "laws" of administra-
tive behavior: (1) In conflicts between political considerations and technocratic re-
quirements, politics usually prevails; (2) Agencies avoid making regulatory decisions
that would create severe social or economic dislocation; (3) Agencies avoid resolving
disputed issues unless they can render scientifically credible judgments; (4) Agencies
will not meet statutory deadlines if budget appropriations, personnel, information, or
other resources are inadequate; (5) Regulators are influenced by disciplinary norms
that may conflict with statutory mandates; (6) Bureaucrats are conditioned by criti-
cism or other forms of negative feedback; (7) Agency behavior is partly conditioned by
manipulative tactics of regulated parties; and (8) Administrators of multiple-purpose
statutes usually "simplify" the decisional process to emphasize only one or two statu-
tory goals).
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promise, 15 politics,16 and their conviction that they alone know
what is best.
If EM was preventing ecosystem deterioration using question-
able means, then one could validly query whether the ends justi-
fied the means. But that is not what is happening. Instead, the
size of the human footprint on the planet continues to grow, and
as it does, it pushes out or corrupts natural (that is, non-human)
characteristics of ecosystems. Neither EM nor any other approach
yet developed has managed to stem this inexorable tide. "Ecosys-
tem creep" is the gradual changing of ecosystems from evolving
native systems of interactions between organisms to systems
shaped by human activity. With or without EM, the proportion of
systems' natural characteristics-those that have not been pro-
duced or changed by people-diminishes.
A discretionary, ad hoc administrative process is not the
mechanism that will halt an incremental slide into a completely
human-made environment. The case against discretionary EM is
not that legal traditions are more valuable than ecosystem integ-
rity, but that limits on discretion are more likely, not less, to pro-
tect such integrity.
C. The present state of the rule of law: managers v.
judges
In Part !V, Ruhl seeks to equate the discretion of managers
and judges. He maintains that like EM, rule-based statutory re-
gimes and precedent-based common law call upon judges to exer-
15. "[Wjhen there is less law and more discretion, there is more room for compro-
mise. In the absence of a bright line rule, decision-makers have room to seek a middle
ground. Compromise is often a good way to resolve disputes. However, it is less fre-
quently so in environmental matters. The past half-century has seen many conflicts
between dire environmental consequences of allowing an activity to proceed and ap-
parently dire economic consequences of preventing an activity from occurring. Such
conflicts are apt to be resolved by finding a compromise - by scaling back or limiting
the activity in some way to reap economic benefits and reduce environmental impacts.
It is often possible to characterize minor environmental impacts as inconsequential,
but significant long term environmental changes can be caused by the accumulation
of small impacts. Compromise allows environmental death from a thousand inconse-
quential cuts." Bruce Pardy, Abstraction, Precedent, and Articulate Consistency: Mak-
ing Environmental Decisions, 34 CAL. W. L. R. 427, 429 (1998).
16. See, e.g., Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Environmental Law in the Political Ecosys-
tem-Coping with the Reality of Politics, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 423 (2003) (discuss-
ing the implications of political pressures in the arena of environmental law); D.
BOYD, UNNATURAL LAW: RETHINKING CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 231
(2003) (discussing the implications of excessive political discretion on environmental
law norms).
20081 345
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cise broad discretion in isolated situations in order to craft results
that fit specific facts. 17 He asserts that this process is not differ-
ent from EM in any important respect.
I agree with Ruhl that discretion-based decision-making is
not limited to EM, or indeed to environmental law. It has become
a feature of administrative action in modern welfare states.18
Statutes grant wide powers to agencies to craft regulation and pol-
icy, with minimal direction and supervision from the legislative
branch.19 Courts have become increasingly indeterminate, partly
because vague statutory language requires them to fill in large
gaps left by legislatures, and partly because of increased reliance
upon policy grounds to justify decisions, sometimes in an overtly
ideological manner. Especially, but not only in environmental
law, one strains to find coherence from case to case. But even
when courts do badly at being consistent and principled, there are
important differences between the judicial process and the un-
supervised administrative powers that characterize EM.
Judges are constrained by the content of the statute, by the
non-legislative nature of their judicial role, by the decisions of
courts interpreting the same statute in previous cases, by the
principles of statutory interpretation, by the expectation that they
will articulate reasons for the result that they have reached, and
by the availability of appeal to a higher court. Separation of pow-
ers still applies. Courts remain limited to their judicial function,
and have the opportunity to fill in gaps only to the extent that the
other two branches leave them gaps to fill. Even when judges rely
on policy grounds or disrupt the theoretical consistency of prece-
dent-based decision-making, they are still subject to inescapable
restrictions on their power.
17. Ruhl, Part IV, supra note 6, at 26-27.
18. Over ten years ago, Bill Scheuerman described this state of affairs: "In every
capitalist welfare state law takes an increasingly amorphous and indeterminate form
as legal standards like 'in the public interest' or 'in good faith' incompatible with
classical liberal conceptions of the legal norm proliferate. Everywhere a troublesome
conflation of traditional parliamentary rulemaking with situation-specific adminis-
trative decrees results; everywhere bureaucratic and judicial discretion grows. If a
minimal demand of the rule-of-law ideal was always that state action should take a
predictable form, contemporary democracies do poorly living up to this standard." Bill
Scheuerman, The Rule of Law and the Welfare State: Towards a New Synthesis, 22
POLITICS & SOC'Y 195, 195 (1994).
19. "What was once generally justified only in time of war or other emergencies
has become increasingly common: the enactment of legislation with very little oppor-
tunity for parliamentary debate and with both the principles and the detail left ini-
tially for the executive to work out and also subject to change at the executive's
whim." D. MuLLAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 135 (2001).
346 [Vol. 25
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Ecosystem managers do not share these limits. Except in
those instances where a statute prescribes a specific, narrow and
well-defined mandate, ecosystem managers typically have broad
discretion to decide what is best-as legislators, administrators,
and judges all rolled into one. They are not accountable in the
same manner as judges. They do not give written reasons. They
do not pretend or attempt to be consistent; indeed, they claim not
to be. They cannot be appealed. There are limited grounds for
judicial review from the exercise of a broad discretionary man-
date. Managers do not share judicial burdens.
D. Rules of law v. rules of science
Discretion is particularly troublesome when there are no gen-
erally applicable, abstract rules. As I argued in my Reply, "It is
not possible to know what priority or emphasis any particular de-
cision maker doing EM will bring to the task precisely for the rea-
son that EM is not governed by general rules.... EM is a process,
not a substantive set of directives." 20 In Part IV, Ruhl takes issue
with this statement. EM does have general rules, he says, but
they are rules of science, not of law:
EM is almost universally embraced [by scientists and resource
management professionals] and I get the impression that these
professionals believe they are following "general rules." Their
general rules, of course, are the rules of science-the scientific
method and its protocols of hypothesis generation, experimenta-
tion, data analysis, peer review, publication and verification. To
the extent that EM finds the scientific method at its core, there-
fore, it follows general rules.21
Ruhl says that there is no important distinction between tech-
nocrats applying scientific rules and judges applying legal rules.
At the risk of sounding pedantic, I suggest that in the realm of
democratic government and the rule of law, these two processes
are as different as night and day. Legal rules are produced under
a system of government subject to structural checks and balances
that provide democratic accountability. Scientific rules are formu-
lated by small peer groups of specialized experts who grant each
other legitimacy. In measuring the power of scientific elites, yes
Professor Ruhl, only legal rules count. The polity has no control
over the "rules" to be followed within a discipline, or worse, by any
20. Pardy, Reply, supra note 5, at 216.
21. Ruhl, Part IV, supra note 6, at 27 (citations omitted).
2008]
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gang of agency scientists. Science's claim to have an exclusive
path to truth should be resisted. Science, after all, is simply one
more way of interpreting the world. It makes an excellent servant
and a poor master.
Moreover, the decisions taken within EM are neither funda-
mentally nor solely scientific. They often do not lie within the ex-
pertise that such professionals possess. Ruhl correctly points out
that within EM, ecosystem-based decisions frequently involve in-
complete scientific information and trade-offs, such as between
ecological and economic interests. Such trade-offs are not 'scien-
tific.' Reconciling social costs and benefits is not a scientific pro-
cess, but a political, economic, and philosophical inquiry. It is
difficult to understand the claim that scientists have exclusive ex-
pertise and authority to make value judgments.
III. COMPLEX-ADAPTIVE PROBLEM SOLVING
Ruhl says that EM is comparable to traditional legal
processes in the kind or degree of discretion that it contains. Yet
he and other advocates of EM regard it as a superior form of envi-
ronmental governance precisely because they claim that it embod-
ies a different kind of decision-making. Ruhl is favorably disposed
towards EM because of its "complex adaptive" problem-solving
characteristics. 22 EM is a dynamic process that consists of a con-
tinual series of actions and measurements that adjusts solutions
to changing conditions, rather than a one-time decision about rela-
tive rights and responsibilities like a judicial decision. In these
respects, and from the perspective of the managers, EM does have
features that resemble a complex adaptive approach. But in legal
terms, EM is not a complex-adaptive problem-solving process.
A. Two problem-solving paradigms
Conventional problem solving is authoritarian, expert driven,
and coercive. It tells people what to do. According to Professor
Thomas Homer-Dixon, who compares the characteristics of con-
ventional and complex-adaptive problem solving,23 conventional
22. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management-Is It Possible?, 7
MiNN. J. L. Sci. & TECH. 21, 22-28 (2005) [hereinafter Regulation by Adaptive Man-
agement]; J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System:
How to Clean up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 HOus-
TON L. REV. 933, 943-65 (1997).
23. T. Homer-Dixon, Professor, Univ. of Toronto, Presentation of Local Food Sys-
tems & Social Resilience at the "Food Down the Road Summit" in Kingston, Ontario
348 [Vol. 25
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problem solving is based upon a mechanistic ontology; has a cen-
tralized and hierarchical social organization; relies on techno-
cratic, expert, explicit knowledge; concentrates power in policy
communities and management elites, located at the top of the so-
cial structure; and is organized around the goal of utility
optimization. 24
Complex-adaptive problem solving is different in each of these
respects. People have autonomy to work out local solutions to lo-
cal problems, using local knowledge and experience rather than
being dependent upon the expertise of distant elites. Complex-
adaptive governance is decentralized, particularized, and di-
verse. 25 It embraces systems that are resilient-ecological and
human-because of the autonomy of their constituent parts to
seek out their own interests and survival. A complex-adaptive ap-
proach is based upon a complex ontology; a decentralized social
organization; knowledge that is based upon mixed, experiential
and tacit experience; power contained in democratic action and
the operation of markets, located at the bottom and middle of the
social strata; and operates to satisfy multiple, often conflicting,
and sometimes incommensurable values. 26
B. EM is not complex-adaptive problem solving
The mandate of EM, Ruhl says, is adaptive management-to
provide dynamic responses to ever changing conditions.27 It is
light on its feet, able to adjust as problems emerge, not wedded to
a single vision, and able to seek the most productive action given
local circumstances. However, EM is, in fact, a conventional deci-
sion-making system that pretends to be enlightened. Its legal
power comes from the centre; its authority is vested in a scientific
elite; managers have the power to compel a plan of action. It is a
conventional decision-making system not because of the method
managers use to solve problems, but because it is coercive.
(Nov. 2, 2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter Local Food]; see generally T. HOMER-
DIXON, THE UPSIDE OF DOWN: CATASTROPHE, CREATIVITY, AND THE RENEWAL OF CIVILI-
ZATION (2007) (postulating that because of the diversity of stresses existing in modern
society, conventional management, with its highly compartmentalized approach to
problem-solving, is not adequate to solve the world's complex issues).
24. Local Food, supra note 23.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. In Ruhl's words, adaptive management is "a methodology that relies on build-
ing models of ecosystem dynamics and then using rigorous testing, monitoring and
evaluation of policy implementations to provide the feedback necessary to promote
long-term ecosystem integrity." Ruhl, Part IV, supra note 6, at 28-29.
2008] 349
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EM is not a process whereby individual citizens or organiza-
tions develop local, innovative solutions to local ecosystem
problems. It does not describe entrepreneurial, voluntary, crea-
tive "abundant small scale experimentation." 28 EM may be com-
plex-adaptive from the perspective of the manager who
experiments, but from the perspective of ordinary citizens, EM is
a prescriptive phenomenon. It tells them what to do. It consists of
an authority giving orders-and not even in a manner in which
the authority can be held to democratic account or legal appeal. It
reflects the voice of specialized expertise. It is top down, expert-
driven technocracy unleashed-in which trained specialists have
carte blanche to express the single-minded inclinations of their
discipline.
Ruhl criticizes command-and-control environmental govern-
ance, and so he should. 29 But EM is simply a variation of com-
mand-and-control environmental law. In EM, managers
command and managers control. Giving power to scientific elites
does not cure the flaws of centralized decision-making. I do not
deny the difficulties (inconsistency, unpredictability, the role of
politics) that have come to dominate the various forms of environ-
mental law. What I challenge is the notion that EM is not worse
in these respects. From the perspective of the governed, the only
meaningful distinction between traditional command-and-control
and EM is that at least command-and-control regulation purports
to be somewhat consistent (even if it largely falls short). EM not
only fails to be consistent, but claims not to be.
C. Prerequisites for ecosystem-based complex-adaptive
problem solving
Ecosystem-based complex-adaptive problem solving requires
generally applicable environmental limits. Such limits do not im-
pose particularized directives from government authorities. In-
stead, they create the space within which adaptive problem
solving can occur. They identify the goal, but not the means by
which the goal is to be achieved.
It is appropriate for government to determine generally appli-
cable environmental limits, for without them common environ-
mental resources are threatened by the pursuit of individual self-
interest. But it is for citizens and communities to decide how they
28. Local Food, supra note 23.
29. See, e.g., Regulation by Adaptive Management, supra note 22, at 54.
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are to adapt to those limits. In other words, government's legiti-
mate role is to decide what the limits are to be; and for the gov-
erned, individually and in groups, to decide how those limits are to
be observed. The first is the role of law; the second is autonomous
adaptation. The first is the role of government; the second is the
right of the citizen. Without general limits, citizens do not have
circumstances within which local, independent, adaptive innova-
tion can take place.
Ecosystem managers do not like the idea of generally applica-
ble environmental limits. They want to decide limits case-by-case.
They also want to be the ones to decide how those limits will be
achieved. In other words, they want to control all of it: the objec-
tives, the value judgments, the social trade-offs, and the particu-
lar means to an end. In challenging the legitimacy of EM, I do not
seek to challenge the notion of complex-adaptive problem solving,
but to question the legitimacy of coercive, authoritarian, techno-
cratic management. The problem with EM is not that it is discre-
tionary and adaptable, but that it is discretionary, adaptable and
coercive.
An ecosystem is a complex adaptive system. One of the most
important characteristics of complex adaptive systems is that they
are unplanned. As such, they cannot be managed (and by man-
aged, I mean controlled by a central authority in order to achieve
particular goals and social outcomes). The act of managing an
ecosystem makes the ecosystem different from what it was and
from what it would have been. I said in my Reply that manage-
ment is anathema to the rule of the law.3 0 It is also inconsistent
with an ecosystem approach.
IV. GENERAL LIMITS: NATURAL V. DESIRABLE
As I have stated in previous installments, EM's mandate is to
fashion a desirable environment in human terms. In Changing
Nature, I quoted Daniel Botkin's proclamation that "[n]ature in
the twenty-first century will be a nature that we make; the ques-
tion is the degree to which this molding will be intentional or un-
intentional, desirable or undesirable."31
I have argued that this process is utilitarian and allows
ecosystem degradation if it happens to conflict with other inter-
30. Pardy, Reply, supra note 5, at 212.
31. Pardy, Changing Nature, supra note 2, at 677 (quoting DANIEL BOTKIN, Dis-
CORDANT HARMONIES: A NEw ECOLOGY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 193 (1990)).
2008]
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ests deemed important. I have also argued that a preferable man-
date is to substitute "natural" for "desirable" because it would
reduce the ability of environmental decision-makers to apply their
own value judgments.
Ruhl complains that distinguishing between natural and un-
natural is also a value judgment. 32 He is right. It values native
characteristics of ecosystems above other interests that might
threaten those characteristics. I could attempt to argue why that
is a proper judgment to make, but that is not the point. The most
important distinction between a natural/unnatural dichotomy and
EM's desirable/undesirable binary choice is not the rightness of
the value judgment but who makes it. The decision to adopt "nat-
ural" as the goal would be made by the legislature, while the "de-
sirable/undesirable" decision is one that each manager is invited
to make-and make differently for every situation.
To see that this is so, consider different circumstances. In-
stead of an ecosystem manager, imagine an officer at a driver li-
censing bureau. Instead of "natural" as the criterion for the
decision, assume that the officer who issues driver licenses must
consider the criterion of "16 years of age or older." The legislature
has made the judgment that 16 years of age is a suitable age for a
license. The officer's function is simply to assess whether the facts
satisfy the test. There is little discretion in this decision.
Now consider the effect if, instead of "16 years of age or older,"
the criterion is "a suitable age."33 The officer is now empowered
not merely to assess evidence of the applicant's age, but also to
apply his or her own judgment about how old an applicant ought
to be. The officer is no longer simply applying the test to the facts,
but making her own value judgment about the nature of the test.
Under this test, different applicants will be granted licenses at dif-
ferent ages.
The story with EM is similar. The pursuit of "desirable" out-
comes gives managers the mandate to make their own value judg-
ments (again, an odd proposition given that they claim scientific
expertise rather than ethical wisdom). The pursuit of "natural"
outcomes significantly narrows the scope of the discretion that
they may exercise, because the value judgment has been made by
the legislature before any manager gets hold of an individual case.
32. Ruhl, Part IV, supra note 6, at 30.
33. See RicHARD EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 25-26 (1995).
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Ruhl, I gather, has two complaints about pursuing "natural"
outcomes. The first is the difficulty in defining what "natural"
means. We have covered some of this ground in earlier parts, so I
will not address it again here. The second, which he raises in Part
V, is that the very idea of "natural" is anthropomorphic-and
therefore, if I understand the objection, is self-contradictory. 34 It
conceives of the idea of not-human from a human point of view.
This claim is obviously true if one wants to be literal and say eve-
rything we do is anthropomorphic. Taken to an extreme, every
idea in the human brain is anthropomorphic-but this sort of ob-
jection gets us nowhere. It implies that we should not attempt to
consider anything beyond ourselves, or to imagine that non-
human elements of the world are definable, even for the purpose
of speaking to each other.
If Ruhl does not approve of "natural" as the criterion to be
used for environmental decisions, then I invite him to propose an-
other. We can use any label he likes-as long as we are told ahead
of time what it is going to mean, and leaves value judgments to
the legislature. Citizens are entitled to know what judgment has
been made, and to know that the same priorities and value judg-
ments will apply to all similar decisions.
V. CONCLUSION
EM makes two problems worse. The first is environmental
creep: the incremental transformation of ecosystems by human
impact. The second is the growth of arbitrariness in environmen-
tal law and policy.
I have argued elsewhere that these two problems are directly
related:
The first is the justification for the second, and the second is one
of the causes of the first. Each particular instance of environ-
mental decline caused by human activity creates a call for inter-
vention; and each particularized intervention contributes to a
system of debilitating indeterminacy that is incapable of stem-
ming the tide of ecosystem degradation.
35
To defend the achievements of EM, Ruhl suggests in the con-
clusion to Part IV that the fact that EM is criticized from both
34. Ruhl, Part IV, supra note 6, at 30.
35. Bruce Pardy, Environmental Law and the Paradox of Ecological Citizenship:
The Case for Environmental Libertarianism, 33 ENV'Ts 25, 26 (2005).
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sides of the fence means that it must be doing something right.
Ruhl refers to EM critic Allan Fitzsimmons who, Ruhl says, con-
demns EM as an idea "formulated by a power-hungry scientific
elite aligned with dark political interests in order to serve their
purely environmental goals without any measure of accountabil-
ity."36 EM must be hitting the right balance, Ruhl says, if it at-
tracts condemnation from both Fitzsimmons and me, because we
must be located at opposite ends of the spectrum.37
But my criticisms and those of Fitzsimmons are not opposite.
We may not agree about the priority that should be given to
ecosystem protection, but we share concerns about process. Fitz-
simmons and I both question EM because it lacks accountability. 3
Fitzsimmons is right to be concerned about the discretionary pur-
suit of environmental politics running roughshod over citizen's in-
terests that get in the way.39 I am concerned about that
eventuality too. I am also concerned about the discretionary pro-
motion of politically powerful economic interests running rough-
shod over native ecosystems. But what is most objectionable is a
system that produces each of these results on different occasions,
as EM does. When there is utilitarian discretion, who knows how
things will turn out in any particular case?
Ruhl wishes to place environmental destinies in the hands of
experts. He believes that they are competent professionals with
the best of intentions-and I believe so too. But the rule of law is
not based upon faith in good intentions. It is achieved by limits to
discretion and structural checks and balances. EM infringes upon
liberties, breaches legal norms, gives control to unaccountable au-
thorities and yet still fails to stem the tide of ecosystem decline.
EM is the best form of environmental protection only if there is no
other choice-which brings us full circle to where we began, to the
myth of the inevitability of EM. The onus is on the managers to
show that EM is now the only possible approach to ecosystem gov-
ernance. Until then, we should look for something better.
36. Ruhl, Part IV, supra note 6, at 34 (emphasis in original) (referring to ALLAN K.
FITzsIMMONS, DEFENDING ILLUSIONS: FEDERAL PROTECTION OF ECOSYSTEMS (1999)).
37. Id. at 26.
38. Id. at 33.
39. Id.
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